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Visiting Fellow, Department of Computer Science, Australian National University
Version of 27 September 1997 (improvements made from the version of 10 September primarily in the final, Design Features section)
© Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, 1997
Invited Address to a Workshop on 'Identity cards, with or without microprocessors: Efficiency versus confidentiality', at the International Conference on Privacy, Montreal, 23-26 September 1997
This paper is at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/IDCards97.html
Multi-purpose identification schemes in general, and national identification schemes in particular, represent the most substantial of information technologies' threats to individual liberties.
This is because they concentrate information, and hence power; and because it is simply inevitable that, at some stage, even in the most apparently stable and free nations, power will be exercised against the interests of individuals, and of the public generally.
Miniaturised computer processors (chips), mounted in such carriers as 'credit-cards', coins, rings and watches, are an important tool. They are now entering widespread use as a means for identifying inert objects such as goods on a production-line and in a logistics-chain, and living things such as valuable animals.
Chips are being proposed as a means of identifying people as well. They present an opportunity to devise and implement highly repressive identification schemes; and many corporations and countries are in the process of harnessing those potentials.
Chips also offer great scope for designing schemes that are privacy-sensitive, and that balance privacy interests against other social and economic interests and law and order concerns. Unfortunately, that scope has to date been almost entirely overlooked or ignored. This paper argues that the simplistic approaches being adopted by the proponents of identification schemes are in the process of destroying public confidence, and hence of undermining the intended return on investment.
This paper builds on the author's substantial prior research and publications in the area. It reviews the social and political risks involved in identification schemes. It then identifies ways in which chip-cards may be applied to address those risks, and achieve balance between the interests of individuals, on the one hand, and of the society and State, on the other.
Privacy-sensitive design options include:
Public concerns about privacy-invasive and repressive applications of information technology must be reflected not only in the designs implemented by scheme operators, but also in policies implemented by governments. It is argued that the focus on 'data protection' that has been adopted during the period 1970-1995 needs to be rapidly matured into a new orientation towards protection of the interests of people.
Insensitive application of intrusive information technologies (including consumer and citizen profiling, matching and linkage among personal databases, video-surveillance, intelligent highways, as well as chip-based identification) is resulting in heightened public concern about the exercise of control over individuals by governments and corporations.
Failure to appreciate the intensity of public concerns, to adapt to it, and to apply chip technologies in privacy-enhancing ways, will result in further cleavage between people and their institutions. This will result in decreased compliance by people with schemes about which they are justifiably suspicious, and failure of chip-based and related technologies to deliver on their potential.
Identification, Anonymity and Pseudonymity
The Assault on Anonymity
Threats in Chip-Based Schemes
Threats in Multi-Purpose Identification Schemes
Threats in Chip-Based Multi-Purpose Identification Schemes
Public Policy Options for Chip-Based ID Schemes
Design Features for Chip-Based ID Schemes
References to Other People's Works
References to the Author's Own Works
This paper is concerned with:
Chip technology has been improving for a quarter-century, and can now support moderate storage-capacity and processing power. Chips are now capable of being hosted in plastic cards, coin-sized tokens and watches, and in goods, and the cartons and pallets whereby goods are delivered. Chip-cards are now being issued in considerable numbers, particularly in public transport and stored-value applications. For a positive perspective on such schemes, see Clarke (1997c).
In many circumstances, it is useful, and even necessary, to identify people. Many different identification techniques are used, including appearance, social behaviour, names, codes, knowledge, tokens, bio-dynamics, natural physiography and imposed physical characteristics.
Chips are capable of being used as a form of enhanced token. They may be embedded in a carrier such as a plastic card, a watch, a ring, a bracelet, or an anklet. ID chips are already being directly implanted in animals, commonly in the ear or the neck of valuable ones like pets and breeding stock. It is unlikely to be long before embedded chips are seriously proposed as a means of identifying humans.
This section firstly provides some examples of the application of chip-based ID to humans, and then explains the purpose and structure of the paper.
Building on the present national photo-id card, the Korean ID Card Project involves a chip-based ID card for every adult member of the population. It is to include scanned fingerprints, and is intended to support the functions of a multi-purpose identifier, proof of residence, a driver's licence, and the national pension card. Its impact is reviewed in Kim (1997).
Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) initiative features a number of 'flagship' applications. One of these is a 'National MultiPurpose Card' (MPC), which is to be a chip-based multi-purpose identification card, with specific support for driving licence, immigration status, and health data. It is expected that its uses will be extended to other electronic government projects.
Of particular significance for other countries is the voluntary and gratis participation in the initial phases of the MPC project of most of the world's major smart card technology developers. They would appear to perceive great advantages to themselves in being involved in the first of what they hope will be a wave of such implementations, throughout at least Asia.
Chip-based technology is bound to be attractive to government agencies that already have substantial databases, in countries whose population is already subject to id schemes. Thailand is an example of a market ripe for the plucking.
"The Thai Ministry of Interior maintains the second-largest relational database in the world ... In conjunction with the Central Population Database project, the Ministry of Interior introduced a new identity card issuing project in early 1994 ... An image of the person's right thumbprint is scanned and stored in the national database at the time of card creation. The card contains printed biographical information and an identification photograph on the front side, and a magnetic strip containing biographical information and a reference to the person's thumbprint on the back side" (technology-provider LSC Inc.'s promotional material).
It is conventional for intrusive, dehumanising technologies (such as genetic testing, genetic manipulation and eugenics) to be first harnessed in contexts that are economically beneficial, and difficult to resist. The popular metaphors for this process are 'the thin end of the wedge', and the frog placed in warm water that is gradually heated to boiling point.
The initial applications of chip-based ID in Anglo-American and European countries appear likely to be to institutionalised people, who are expensive to administer, and whose human rights are in any case subject to greater than usual qualifications. The most obvious examples are:
People afflicted by the slow processes of other institutions may be readily attracted to voluntarily participate in such schemes. Since 1995, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS), based on a card bearing a measure of the holder's hand-geometry, has been in use at New York's International Airports as a means of expediting the clearance of frequent travellers.
The official information available on INSPASS does not appear to even mention privacy matters. Indeed, the challenge is seen as merely "How then do we balance the needs of enforcement; the prompt identification and denial of entry to persons we, as a nation, do not want to allow into our country, with the needs of facilitation; the prompt admission of those we want to welcome?". The scheme is justified with the hilariously incorrect statement that "In the past, the right of travel was only paid lip service in most countries. Only recently, with the convergence of democratic trends around the world and the advent of relatively cheap international air travel, have people been able to exercise the right to travel" ( Ronald J. Hays, 4 January 1996).
Immigration officials in other countries, many of them with the same cavalier, even imperious, attitude of their U.S. equivalents, are understood to be trialling similar technologies.
Comprehensive chip-based ID schemes are not restricted to Asian countries. The United Kingdom differs significantly from its Continental European partners in that it does not have a general-purpose ID card. The Conservative Government spent some years developing a proposal for a chip-based scheme, but this was abandoned by the recently-elected Labour Government. The primary impulse for the scheme came from within the ranks of the civil service; so it will doubtless re-appear as a Labour initiative, once the new Government becomes tired and begins to depend on civil servants for ideas.
Driver licensing authorities can generally see little benefit in upgrading their existing cards to chip-based technology. On the other hand, such a development can be readily harnessed to multiple purposes. According to The Winds (1997), the U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 contained an obscure passage amending Title IV, section 656(b) in order to convert state drivers' licences into a national ID card. Comprehensive information on this matter is to be found in the National ID Archives of the Electronic Privacy Information Centre.
Attempts have been made to generate momentum towards general-purpose inhabitant identification schemes in at least Canada as a whole, Ontario and Quebec. Several of the initiatives have centred around health insurance and health applications. A trial of a chip-based ID card has been held in Quebec.
To what extent does a chip-based ID scheme represent merely a confirmatory identification method, with limited privacy-invasiveness, and to what extent is it a basis for comprehensive surveillance, and for authoritarian rather than democratic society?
This paper first reviews the notions of identification, anonymity and pseudonymity, and the threats that identified data and transactions represent to individuals and to societies. This leads into an assessment of multi-purpose identification and inhabitant registration schemes.
Chips are shown to create opportunities for designers, such that chip-based ID schemes can deny privacy outright, or can be implemented in a privacy-sensitive and even privacy-protective manner. An assessment is undertaken of the likelihood of public concern forcing governments and designers to be extremely careful with this society-threatening technology. Specific proposals are provided, in relation to both public policy and technical design.
Human identification is the association of data with a particular human being ( Clarke 1994c). It is used in relation to historical data held on files, and to new transaction data that captures aspects of real-world events.
A number of bases are available to assist in formal identification. None of them satisfies all of the desirable characteristics. Organisations therefore combine identification techniques in order to achieve an appropriate balance between the harm arising from false-inclusions (i.e. associating data with the wrong person), and from false-exclusions (i.e. failing to associate data with the right person).
An approach that is commonly adopted when an organisation first establishes a relationship with a person, is to seek a variety of information about them, from a variety of sources. In the absence of inconsistencies or 'bad' references, the person is accepted as being identified by that loose set of data.
To facilitate identification during subsequent interactions between the organisation and the individual, a token (typically a card) is issued to the individual. To engender sufficient confidence in the person's identity, an organisation may seek not only production of the token, but also of knowledge that only the individual would be expected to have, such as a password or 'personal identification number' (PIN).
Dependence on documents, tokens and knowledge produce a system of at best moderate reliability. With developments in technology, some organisations are increasingly attracted to biometrics. This is the identification of an individual through a measure of some part of their person, or of something that the person does.
There are some kinds of transactions that cannot reasonably be performed without the disclosure, verification and recording of the parties' identities. This is usefully referred to as 'identity authentication'. An important class of circumstances in which identity authentication is needed is where an undertaking is given by a person to perform some action in the future, e.g. repaying a loan; or appearing in court, in return for the granting of bail.
There are further kinds of transactions in which one party wishes to satisfy themselves as to the appropriateness of the other party participating in that particular class of interaction (e.g. by virtue of their age, affiliation, authority to represent a particular organisation, or qualification for a concession). One convenient way to perform such 'eligibility authentication' is for one party to provide evidence of identity, but for the other to record no more than that satisfactory evidence was provided (e.g. recording 'driver's licence sighted', rather than the licence-number). A special case of this is where a person collects a privacy-sensitive document (such as medical information), or a token intended to serve as evidence of identity (such as a passport).
Anonymous data is data that cannot be associated with a particular person. There is a vast range of transactions for which identification is not a logical prerequisite. These include cash payments of all kinds, barter transactions, telephone and counter enquiries, and inspection of publications on library premises.
Depending on the context, identification may assist in protecting the interests of one or both of the parties, or of third parties, or of society as a whole. It also threatens the identified party, for reasons summarised in the following section. Anonymity satisfies the interests of individuals in avoiding the accumulation of data-holdings by others about them; but may compromise interests of other parties.
An alternative exists, that represents a compromise between the extremes of identification and anonymity. A pseudonym is an identifier for a party to a transaction, which is not, in the normal course of events, sufficient to associate the transaction with a particular human being. The data may, however, be indirectly associated with the person, if particular procedures are followed.
The simplest (although by no means the only) way to implement a pseudonymous scheme is to maintain an index that correlates the pseudo-identifier with a reliable identifer for the person, and to subject it to technical, organisational and legal protections. Hence individuals may be, in practical terms, anonymous, except where circumstances justify access to the index, e.g. where a search warrant is issued to a law enforcement agency.
The principles of pseudonymity are reasonably well-known, yet they have been remarkably under-applied. Clarke 1995c examines the technique and its importance as a means of achieving balance between conflicting interests.
There already exist large numbers of data trails that individuals leave behind them; and new technologies are resulting in new trails being created ( Clarke 1995d).
During much of the current century, organisations have been seeking to reduce the costs involved in the administration of their relationships with individuals, by replacing the human touch with automation. This has resulted in an incentive for greater 'data intensity' in those relationships (Rule 1974).
Organisations are seeking to exploit the ongoing technological revolutions, and are trying to convert hitherto anonymous transactions into identified ones. Examples include:
Government agencies are frequently in a position to legally impose on individuals the condition that they identify themselves when performing particular kinds of transactions. Corporations may use a combination of inducements and market power to achieve the same end.
Dataveillance is the systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons. Personal surveillance is the surveillance of an identified person. Mass surveillance is the surveillance of groups of people, usually large groups, generally so as to identify individuals who belong to some particular class of interest to the surveillance organization, or perhaps to repress their behaviour.
Organisations acquire power over individuals through the accumulation of data about them. They can enhance that power by drawing data from multiple sources. Individuals are generally incapable of withstanding the pressure, and of enforcing correction of erroneous data, mistaken judgements and unreasonable decisions.
At the level of society as a whole, further serious problems arise, as a climate of suspicion prevails, and individual self-determination and diversity are strangled by the 'chilling effect' of omnipresent monitoring.
The threats of dataveillance to privacy are well-documented (e.g. Clarke 1988), and are not further examined here.
Chip-cards are capable of being applied to a great many purposes. This section provides a brief scan of the privacy implications of several of them. Additional analyses are to be found in the N.S.W. Privacy Committee's 'Smart Cards: Big Brother's Little Helpers' (1995); and in Privacy International's archives on Identity Cards.
An assessment of the privacy issues in the retail financial sector Clarke (1996d) identified the following major concerns:
Beyond their applications in financial services, cards and their associated databases can provide evidence of identity and of affiliation. The risks have been dramatised, although not unduly exaggerated, using the catchcry "Is your Jew-bit set?", and "Let your card 'out' your homosexuality for you!". Beyond the well-known examples such as the fate of Jews in The Netherlands at the time of the Nazi invasion, recent press reports suggested that racial information associated with the national id card was used in distingushing people's tribal association during the Ruanda massacres.
Two further applications of chips are of great significance. The first of these is as a means of carrying the cryptographic keys that are very likely to be used by people in the near future to encrypt messages, and to digitally sign electronic documents. There is a serious risk that one maverick nation, the United States, may continue its unrealistic, Cold War-era stance, and seek the ability to intrude into individuals' private keys.
In any case, digital signatures, and the key certification authority mechanism to support them, generate a range of privacy implications. These are examined in Greenleaf & Clarke (1997).
Another application of a chip is to carry a biometric, i.e. a measure of some part of a person such as a fingerprint, or the geometry of a hand, finger, or thumb; or of some pattern of the person's behaviour, such as the dynamics of signature-writing or password-typing. The biometric can then be used to test whether the person presenting the card is likely to be the same as the person to whom it was issued. It could also be used as a means of unlocking the encryption keys stored on the same chip. Biometrics are for many people highly intrusive and threatening. Depending on how they are applied, they could not just seem that way, but be that way.
Many identification schemes are used by a single organisation, for a single purpose; but there are obvious attractions in sharing the costs across multiple organisations and business functions.
A special case of a multi-purpose id scheme is what is usefully described as an 'inhabitant registration scheme'. This provides everyone in a country with a unique code, and a token (generally a card) containing the code. It is typically used for the administration of taxation, national superannuation and health insurance. In some countries, is is used for additional purposes, such as the administration of social welfare and banking, and to ensure that particular rights are exercised only by people entitled to them, such as the exercise of voting rights, the right of residence, the right to work, the right of movement across the country's borders, and the right of movement within the country.
Inhabitant registration schemes are endured, and perhaps even welcomed, by the inhabitants of some countries; but are disliked, actively opposed, and undermined in many others.
Privacy-related protections vary from very little to moderately strong; but the very existence of such a scheme represents a threat against which mere 'data protection' or 'fair information practices' arrangements are almost an irrelevance. The public policy aspects of schemes of this nature are discussed in (Clarke 1992), and at Clarke (1994c).
To create a surveillance society, three conditions need to be fulfilled:
The first two have been satisfied during the last two decades, as a result of the application of information technology. The third is accordingly the critical technical factor inhibiting the achievement of a surveillance society. Inhabitant registration schemes overcome that hurdle ( Clarke 1988).
It can be no surprise that the application of chips to comprehensive, multi-purpose ID schemes results in a compounding of the privacy threats that arise from each of them.
An assessment is to be found in Davies (1996), especially at pp. 75-133, 161-175. The book is reviewed at Clarke (1996e).
In Clarke (1994c), the conclusion was reached that:
Any high-integrity identifier represents a threat to civil liberties, because it represents the basis for a ubiquitous identification scheme, and such a scheme provides enormous power over the populace. All human behaviour would become transparent to the State, and the scope for non-conformism and dissent would be muted to the point envisaged by the anti-utopian novellists.
The highest-integrity schemes combine physically intrusive data-collection with a potentially ubiquitous instrument of power. As a result, the kinds of multi-purpose identification schemes, or inhabitant registration systems, which would appear capable of exciting the greatest degree of concern are those based on DNA-printing and implanted chips.
Jeremy Bentham's 1791 conception of the 'panopticon' depended on line of sight, visual surveillance, by prison warders, from a high tower. Foucault's twentieth century image of modern society as prison is associated with dataveillance rather than visual surveillance methods (Foucault 1977). The creator of the chip-card recognised at the time, in 1974, that the most central element of the 'virtual panopticon' is the enforced, computer-readable, real-time monitorable identifying chip.
General policy considerations are addressed in Clarke (1996d). These encompass:
It is readily argued that governments are captives of business interests, and that social interests will therefore necessarily capitulate to economic interests. On the other hand, public concerns in many countries are a considerable political force. A substantial example of community impact on policy in Australia is documented in Clarke (1987). Overviews of community attitudes in that country are provided at Clarke (1996b), and in Clarke (1997a). Similarly high levels of concern exist in many other countries.
In Clarke (1996b), it is argued that the public's increasing wariness of the power that IT offers organisations is resulting in increasingly clear demands for greatly enhanced privacy protections. There are many signs of imminent change. Organisations that are slow to appreciate these new realities risk suffering the consequences; whereas those that move proactively to gain a competitive or strategic advantage from their privacy stance, will reap the benefits.
From the analysis conducted in this paper, it would seem inevitable that chip-based ID schemes threaten privacy, and that a direct conflict exists between the deployment of chips in ID cards and the survival of the kinds of relatively free and democratic society that advanced nations aspire to.
Because of their programmability, however, chips are very flexible instruments. They offer such a wide scope to the scheme designer that they can in fact be applied with several alternative effects:
This final section identifies particular design features that need to be adopted by the sponsors of schemes that apply chip technology to identification-related purposes.
The first cluster of requirements relates to the avoidance of dangerously privacy-invasive multi-purpose identification:
The second cluster of requirements relates to the provision of individuals with a significant degree of control over processes involving chip-based ID cards:
These design features create additional challenges for organisations planning the use of chips as a basis for an identification scheme. But they provide a basis whereby organisations can achieve their legitimate aims, yet individuals can be assured that the schemes are not unduly privacy-invasive.
Chip-based ID embodies the most serious perils for free and democratic societies. One scenario is direct conflict between the power of governments and government agencies, supported by corporations, on the one hand, and, on the other, a populace that is unprepared to go meekly to the slaughter.
But the technology also holds promise. As a result, an alternative scenario exists, in which chips are applied in a manner that balances the interests of the State and of corporations against those of individuals. This will fail to achieve the nirvana of a controlled and efficiently-run society, with individuals treated as goods, and behaving in a manner no less predictable than livestock; but in return it will sustain humanity.
The time for choice between those two scenarios is not remote. It is now.
Bentham J. (1791) 'Panopticon; or, the Inspection House', London, 1791
Davies S. (1992) 'Big Brother: Australia's Growing Web of Surveillance' Simon & Schuster, Sydney, 1992
Davies S. (1996) 'Monitor: Extinguishing Privacy on the Information Superhighway', Pan Macmillan Australia, 1996
EPIC (1995-) 'National ID Cards', Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington DC, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/default.html
Foucault M. (1977) 'Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison' Peregrine, London, 1975, trans. 1977
Kim J. (1997) 'Digitized Personal Information and the Crisis of Privacy: The Problems of Electronic National Identification Card Project and Land Registry Project in South Korea', at http://kpd.sing-kr.org/idcard/joohoan2.html
NSWPC (1995) 'Smart Cards: Big Brother's Little Helpers', The Privacy Committee of New South Wales, No.66, August 1995, at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/privacy/smart/
Privacy International (1996) 'Privacy International's FAQ on Identity Cards'', at http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/idcard/
Rule J.B. (1974) 'Private Lives and Public Surveillance: Social Control in the Computer Age' Schocken Books, 1974
The Winds (1997) 'The future has arrived' (June 1997), at http://www.thewinds.org/archive/government/idcard6-97.html
Clarke R. (1987) 'Just Another Piece of Plastic for Your Wallet: The Australia Card' Prometheus 5,1 June 1987 Republished in Computers & Society 18,1 (January 1988), with an Addendum in Computers & Society 18,3 (July 1988). At http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/OzCard.html
Clarke R. (1988) 'Information Technology and Dataveillance', Commun. ACM 31,5 (May 1988). Republished in C. Dunlop and R. Kling (Eds.), 'Controversies in Computing', Academic Press, 1991, at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/CACM88.html
Clarke R. (1992) 'The Resistible Rise of the National Personal Data System' Software Law Journal 5,1 (January 1992) , at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/SLJ.html
Clarke R. (1993a) 'Why the Public Is Scared of the Public Sector', IIR Conference paper February 1993. Abstract at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/AbstractPubSector.html
Clarke R. (1993b) 'Profiling: A Hidden Challenge to the Regulation of Data Surveillance', Journal of Law and Information Science 4,2 (December 1993), at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PaperProfiling.html. . A shorter version was published as 'Profiling and Its Privacy Implications' Australasian Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 1,6 (November 1994), at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/AbstractProfiling.html
Clarke R.A. (1994a) 'The Digital Persona and Its Application to Data Surveillance' The Information Society 10,2 (June 1994), at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/DigPersona.html
Clarke R. (1994b) 'Information Technology: Weapon of Authoritarianism or Tool of Democracy?' Proc. World Congress, Int'l Fed. of Info. Processing, Hamburg, September 1994. At http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PaperAuthism.html
Clarke R. (1994c) 'Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues' Information Technology & People 7,4 (December 1994) 6-37, at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/HumanID.html
Clarke R. (1994d) 'Dataveillance by Governments: The Technique of Computer Matching' Information Technology & People 7,2 (December 1994). Abstract at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/AbstractMatchIntro.html
Clarke R. (1995a) 'Computer Matching by Government Agencies: The Failure of Cost/Benefit Analysis as a Control Mechanism' Informatization and the Public Sector (March 1995). At http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/MatchCBA.html
Clarke R. (1995b) 'A Normative Regulatory Framework for Computer Matching' Journal of Computer and Information Law XIII,4 (Summer 1995) 585-633. Abstract at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/AbstractMatchReg.html
Clarke R. (1995c) 'When Do They Need to Know 'Whodunnit?': The Justification for Transaction Identification; The Scope for Transaction Anonymity and Pseudonymity' Proc. Conf. Computers, Freedom & Privacy, San Francisco, 31 March 1995. At http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PaperCFP95.html. Revised version published as 'Transaction Anonymity and Pseudonymity' Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 2, 5 (June/July 1995) 88-90. Condensed paper published as 'Identification, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Consumer Transactions: A Vital Systems Design and Public Policy Issue', October 1996, at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/AnonPsPol.html
Clarke R. (1995d) 'Trails in the Sand', at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Trails.html
Clarke R. (1996a) 'Smart move by the smart card industry: The Smart Card Industry's Code of Conduct' Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 2, 10 (January 1996) 189-191, 195. At http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/SMSC.html
Clarke R. (1996b) 'Privacy and Dataveillance, and Organisational Strategy', EDPAC Conference Paper (May 1996), at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PStrat.html
Clarke R. (1996c) 'Data Transmission Security, or Cryptography in Plain Text'Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 3, 2 (May 1996), pp. 24-27 , at http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/CryptoSecy.html
Clarke R. (1996d) 'Privacy Issues in Smart Card Applications in the Retail Financial Sector', in 'Smart Cards and the Future of Your Money', Australian Commission for the Future, June 1996, pp.157-184. At http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/ACFF.html
Clarke R. (1996e) 'The Information Infrastructure is a Super Eye-Way: Book Review of Simon Davies' 'Monitor'' Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 3, 5 (August 1996), at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Monitor.html
Clarke R. (1997a) 'What Do People Really Think? MasterCard's Survey of the Australian Public's Attitudes to Privacy', Privacy Law & Policy Report 3,9 (January 1997), at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/MCardSurvey.html
Clarke R. (1997b) 'Flaws in the Glass; Gashes in the Fabric: Deficiencies in the Australian Privacy-Protective Regime', Invited Address to Symposium on 'The New Privacy Laws', Sydney, 19 February 1997 , at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Flaws.html
Clarke R. (1997c) 'Smart Cards in Banking and Finance' The Australian Banker 111,2 (April 1997), at http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/SCBF.html
Clarke R. (1997d) 'Privacy and 'Public Registers'', Proc. IIR Conference on Data Protection and Privacy, Sydney, 12-13 May 1997, at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PublicRegisters.html
Greenleaf G.W. & Clarke R. (1997) 'Privacy Implications of Digital Signatures', IBC Conference on Digital Signatures, Sydney, 12 March 1997, at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/DigSig.html
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