Shaw Pittman, London
Principal, Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, Canberra
Visiting Fellow, Department of Computer Science, Australian National University
Version of 30 April 1999
© Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, 1999
This article was prepared for presentation at the User Identification & Privacy Protection Conference, Stockholm, 14-15 June 1999
Republished in Computer Law & Security Report 16, 2 (March/April 2000) CLSR 95-101
This document is at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/AnonLegal.html
his paper examines the notions of identification, authentication and anonymity in a legal context. It builds on the assumption that user identification in electronic media represents a significant threat to personal privacy protection. This paper considers whether the trend toward more rigorous identification and authentication has a justifiable legal basis, and if so whether enforcement of such procedures ought to take precedence over concerns for personal privacy.
Identifying users of electronic media poses a significant threat to personal privacy. The Internet has the capacity to erode personal privacies we once took for granted. The effect of rapid progress in technological developments has had two very profound effects. First, it has made seemingly infinite information processing, and storage capacity possible. Second, this has tempted many organisations to succumb to a technological imperative to gather and authenticate ever more data about people and their behaviour, effectively converting previously anonymous transactions into identified transactions. Goldberg et al (1997) identify two further threats to privacy in the online environment, those being that your actions could be "(1) monitored by unauthorised parties and (2) logged and preserved for future access for many years." Add to this sophisticated data mining technologies that extrapolate a wide of trends and generalisations from data that is collected in an individual or group's virtual dossier.
In many instances it is not enough to simply gather data. Organisations are increasingly seeking to authenticate the identity of their subjects. Public key cryptography and digital signatures are increasingly linked with proposals to make people carry chip-cards that store their private keys. There are even suggestions to use more biometric mechanisms to identify people, and as protective features for their private keys. These may include fingerprint or iris reading, or any other number of methods to measure a physical characteristic uniquely linked to an individual. The development of authentication technologies are regarded by many as highly intrusive modes of identification and information gathering. Organisations in both the public and private sectors are continuing to develop and implement technologies that convey the authority to require identification of parties, and to impose authentication requirements in order to assure the quality of those identities.
As awareness of these issues grows, governments around the world are responding by introducing legislation to curb the effect of technology on personal privacy. In Europe, the EU Data Protection Directive attempts to curb the negative effects that may result from the collection of and processing of ever more personal data. However most legislation is inadequately adapted to the dynamic technologies it seeks to tame. Anonymity is one method of protecting privacy that is often overlooked. Goldberg et al (1997) describe anonymity as the "privacy of identity", and by acting anonymously you diminish the ability to link data with a specific authenticated identity.
The concepts of identification and authentication sit uneasily at the crossroads of social and economic electronic transactions. There appears to be an increasingly dichotomous relationship between the use of digital technology for commercial and for non-commercial purposes with respect to the requirement for identification and authentication. For example, many proponents of electronic commerce believe that greater certainty and trust will be created with the greater use of identification and authentication technologies. On the other hand, there is a strong tendency to act either anonymously or pseudonymously in discussion groups, bulletin boards and in MUDs. Increasingly, many individuals and organisations are seeking to clarify their right to act anonymously or pseudonymously in both commercial and non-commercial transactions.
These conflicting trends squarely raise the issue of whether there is any legal imperative for people or organisations to identify themselves or authenticate a claim to a given identity each time they engage in an electronic communication or commercial transaction. Although there are exceptions, the general conclusion is that there is generally little or no legal compulsion to definitively link a set of data to a particular individual in the course of conducting electronic both commercial and non-commercial transactions, and organisations seeking to do so ought to be regarded with a commensurate degree of scepticism. So although authentication procedures undoubtedly have a role to play in the conduct of electronic transactions, their use must be questioned, and tempered with the concomitant interests in maintaining privacy and personal integrity.
People and institutions frequently adopt identification and authentication in their activities. However, this is rarely the result of a legal obligation. More commonly it is a voluntary measure serving a pragmatic purpose. Thus the motivations are purely functional, based on the fact that in many situations it is simply convenient to know a party's identity even though the law does not require it.
Many organisations have adopted the practice of requesting that parties to electronic transactions be named. Individuals may potentially benefit from this trend when engaging in a relationship with an organisation on an ongoing basis. For example, being known to an organisation where one is a consumer of that organisation's goods and services may reap practical advantages in the form of privileges extended by the organisation in later transactions.
Reward programs are well-known for encouraging customer allegiance in relation to certain retailers in exchange for discounts and bonus products. Other instances of consumer-vendor relationships are more subtle, such as where a restaurateur, hairdresser, aquaerobics instructor or pharmacist knows your personal preferences and requirements, and is able to automatically cater for your needs.
Organisations more frequently wish to identify their customers because it is in their own interest to do so. Having information about a client or consumer provides reassurance that the organisation will have its debts paid, assists the organisation in allocating its resources, and facilitates the operation of internal administrative functions in a manner best suited to satisfying the needs of the client or consumer efficiently. Companies also want to collect data to mine it for valuable information. Such information may indicate certain preferences that can later be targeted, or it can enable the company to sell differentially into different market segments. An organisation needs personal information to classify customers into market segments, and the more detailed the information, the smaller each segment becomes, and the more effectively targeted the product is. Some consumers regard this as manipulation, while others merely consider it part of the process of doing business online.
The growth of large and impersonal bureaucracies and commercial enterprises, coupled with a reduction of personal trust in continuing economic relationships, has fuelled the motivation for the modern practice of attaching an identity to transactions. Unlike the local shopkeeper who knows his customers from nearby streets, the impersonal organisation is incapable of retaining information about its clientele implicitly. Consequently the organisation has been driven to develop explicit information gathering and retention systems for building a corporate `memory' needed to cater for the personal needs and tastes of its clientele.
This partly explains the apparent paradox of the modern experience that the individual is faced with greater demands for records of personal information in commercial environment which is potentially very impersonal and where personal trust is minimal. Electronic commerce and automated transaction processing are perhaps the most typical examples of this evolution in the individual-organisation relationship. In the course of conducting electronic commerce, the driving imperative to gather ever more detailed data about participants certainly is growing, and disclosing personal information has become so commonplace in the modern commercial climate that individuals who opt not to disclose information may be regarded with an unjustified level of suspicion.
The most common identifier is a person's name. However, many people use names that differ from their name as it is stated on their birth certificates. Married women may use their maiden names for professional purposes and some people use their middle name instead of their first name in everyday life. Pseudonyms are particularly common in certain professions, either to protect a person from potential danger or as part of an artist's or writer's creative persona.
In general there are few legislative controls on the use of names or the manifestation of different identities. A couple exceptions to this rule may be identified in Australia. Section 11 of the federal Australian Aliens Act, and state laws like Western Australia's Change of Name Regulation Act require name changes to be in a specified form, and sometimes with specific permission. This Act is honoured copiously in the breach. Other than that, the common law recognises that a name acquired `by reputation' is a legally valid form of identification. Basically people are relatively free to adopt another name but they will need to be relatively consistent with using that name over time, more for reasons of practicality rather than reasons of law.
Aside from issues of legislation and fraud, the only legal factor that appears to prevent people from arbitrarily taking on new names to complement different identities is the question of evidence. This concern can be eliminated by signing a deed poll to change one's name in a government registry, however this mechanism would only allow one name to be registered at any one time. Clarke argues that although "there may be such thing as a `legal name of a person', but there is no compulsion to use it, and no prohibition on using any other name or names instead" (1994). He contends that a name is acquired by reputation; and any number of names can be acquired through any number of reputations in any number of contexts. In social contexts, your `first' or `given' name may be enough. There are some situations, such as the simple supermarket transaction, where no name or other identifier is required at all.
Names are not the only common form of identifier. Common identifiers include age and sex, but these are not necessarily very effective for refining identities. Unique identifiers such as identification numbers may be used where a high degree of differentiation is required. This alleviates problems with people like me, where the title "A. Smith" is not enough to distinguish me from the other twenty "A. Smiths" in their files.
Other methods of identification include knowledge (for example of a personal identification number), or token (for example a credit card). Biometric methods of identification, such as iris reading or hand prints, appear set to become more widespread at some stage in the future, but as yet they have not gained widespread acceptance. The technology is still quite expensive and it is not necessary for most purposes.
In respect of certain categories of activities, identification and authentication may be imposed as a consequence of the activity being regulated by government or the state. In these situations a wider purpose is being served than the purely functional purposes of a particular person's convenience.
The common theme in relation to activities regulated by the state appears to be that the state can require your identity in many cases where it is considered to be in the `public interest' to do so. In many situations this will be the case where the state is providing a right in the sense that it is granting the individual something that the person is not fundamentally entitled to. For example, the notion of a driver's licence is that the state allows you to engage in activity that would otherwise not be allowed, (for example driving on public roads), so it can require you to meet certain conditions. The underlying justification for this position is that the state has the power to enforce against transgressions where it has a monopoly on a particular facility or resource. If you drive in your backyard you would not need a licence because you are not driving in a place subject to a state monopoly, as is the case with public roads.
Most countries regulate their banking sectors to some degree for the simple reason that banking is critically important to a country's economic welfare. In the United States and Australia the federal government has control over banking under those countries' respective constitutions.
In past centuries incorporation of companies was viewed as a concession by the state to the needs of business, whereas today it is regarded more as a right to free association of individuals, and an expression of economic liberty. However, it is still very much the case that there is no general right to engage in banking. For important social and economic reasons it is still a concession of the state and is usually heavily regulated. As such, the state can impose controls requiring identification and authentication to ensure that movements of money are legitimate. That in turn provides social benefits for the general community as well as consolidating the position of the state because the state stands to lose power if people can move money both into and out of the country without any restriction.
It also suits the banks quite nicely to have the government impose on them a requirement to authenticate the identities presented to them, because it provides them with an effective marketing-data quality-assurance tool, and any consumer resistance is warded off with the explanation that it is a government requirement.
What we commonly call "owning property" is really a right to the property rather than ownership the land itself. Although we often talk about `property' referring to objects, or the land we are standing on, but in law what you `possess' is a right to the land. In many cases when you have `real estate' it is a right to use and to exclude others. Similarly, intellectual property is constituted by a bundle of rights often including the right to reproduce a work and to stop others from doing so.
People have rights. Rights to not exist as isolated abstractions. Anonymous people are in a weak position in attempting to assert their rights because of the difficulty of ascertaining exactly whose rights are being asserted, and correspondingly whose rights must be respected. For example, it could be argued that if you do not have an identity, you may be faced with difficulties in excluding others from the land. If someone encroaches on your land in some way you can try to remove them, but eventually proof of your identity linked with the property may be needed as a foundation for asserting your rights against the trespasser. In personal property situations these matters rarely pose a problem because it's much easier to exercise physical control over the item which the right is concerned with, for example by strapping a watch to your wrist.
Parties to real estate transactions do not need to use identities in respect of each other, because each authenticates the value of the consideration. Also, a party may act through an agent who buys the property on another's behalf and holds it on trust for the beneficial owner. It is only in respect of the relationship between the state and each party that any actual compulsion may exist. The fundamental reason is that the state has sovereign authority over territory. In the United Kingdom tradition this is reflected in the notion that the root of title to land can be traced to the Crown. In the US the power of all states in the federation to exercise their power over property in their territory is called the `power of eminent domain'. In Australia the ultimate source of legal authority can be traced to the Commonwealth Constitution. The central theme is that transactions relating to land have an ultimate root in some central authority. Consequently, real estate transactions may be distinguished from other contractual transactions involving personal property, which result from a meeting of two or more independent minds.
In law real estate has a special position because it is in principle regarded as being `unique'. This consideration provides a potential additional basis for treating real estate transactions in a special way. Since the land is supposed to be unique, it is compatible with being matched together with a unique identity. This raises some important issues in relation to domain names because they are the most analogous item in cyberspace to physical land. The phenomenon of cyber-squatting may be one example, and a similar analysis may apply in respect of other domain naming issues. It demonstrates how states have exercised their jurisdiction to compel people to give back virtual real estate to `owners'. While the case law in relation to domain name issues is still nascent, it may be useful at least to consider what impact existing real estate law may have on domain name analysis.
Perhaps the broader principle to transplant from the real property environment to the virtual environment is that where there is a form of monopoly, as with real property, there may be scope for government intervention.
In many countries, government departments and agencies have uncertain identities, and usually have no effective means of authentication. For example, in the United Kingdom the Minister has a right to contract on behalf of his or her ministry, and as long as that person's identity is sufficiently authenticated, the ministry will be bound. This is particularly anomalous in the context of calls for all parties to electronic transactions to identify themselves and authenticate their identities. The lines are further being blurred as so many governmental agencies have, over recent decades, been embarking on a trend of ever-increasing commercialisation and engagement of the private sector.
This issue is particularly important in the context of growth in privatisation of government assets, and the outsourcing of government requirements and functions, including IT. A degree of caution may be warranted where previous government monopolies on functions of the state, like distribution of welfare payments, are passed into the hands of the private sector, together with private information on citizens that the state has collected over time.
There was an instance in Australia where a bus passenger from Warringah had an argument with a bus-driver late on Saturday night, was arrested, and refused to give his identity. He was carrying nothing that identified him. His fingerprints did not match any previously recorded on the national fingerprint system. He was denied bail. His case was heard on the following Monday. He was fined, but, lacking the money to pay the fine, chose to stay in gaol the requisite amount of time to extinguish the debt to the Crown. He then walked away, without ever had to identifying himself.
Consider under what circumstances is a person under legal compulsion to provide a law enforcement officer, or a court, with identifiers such as: proof of identification, fingerprints, samples of tissue or body-fluids, and access to personal possessions. Beyond these considerations lurk further questions regarding what powers and sanctions can be exercised to enforce the law.
There are specific prohibitions against using pseudonyms in court, as it is regarded as a fraud on the court.
A distinction must be made between use of a pseudonym or choosing to remain anonymous by not providing a name for the purpose of protecting privacy, and cases where a pseudonym is used for the purpose of defrauding a person or government. Although the simple act of using a different name (say Anita Jones instead of Anita Smith) is not illegal in most cases, if it causes harm to others, there are specific laws to prevent such activity.
Criminal fraud arises when you use a different identity to achieve certain ends that are illegal. An example might be where different names are used to assert two mutually exclusive or contradictory sets of facts, such as if you own investments under your `real' name and do tax returns under another. The illegality is not in the mere use of two names, but the fraud that you can perpetrate by doing so. In this case, you could make out a tax return including information that is not accurate, namely that you do not own certain assets or derive income from them.
Like all criminal acts, there must be a mental element involved. You must either intend to cause harm or to gain some advantage by providing false information.
Opening credit accounts at different banks under different names may be illegal under banking regulations. But if there is no contradiction in the relationship between the products or services, there is little compulsion to use the same identity each time. For example, you could use different names with different loyalty schemes, or magazine subscriptions with little or no retribution.
Most countries have specific laws that make deception in certain contexts illegal. For example, obtaining welfare benefits by providing false information or knowingly giving inaccurate information on a tax return.
There are several potential causes of action in the law of tort that may be connected with the use of a pseudonym. Most of these involve the protection of trading or business interests, and these could be applied to electronic trading on the Internet. The tort of fraudulent misrepresentation requires an intention to harm. The tort of negligent misrepresentation may also be invoked, but to prove a case of negligent misrepresentation there must be a duty of care, a breach of that duty and the damage caused must have been reasonably foreseeable. In cyberspace it may be difficult to establish the existence of a duty of care, and if it did exist it would probably rest with the party in a transaction that wants to obtain the information about identity (generally the vendor organisation) rather than the party concerned about disclosing its identity and identity-related information (usually the consumer). Furthermore, very special circumstances would be required to make reasonably foreseeable any harm that might be incurred through manipulation or non-disclosure of identity in cyberspace.
The well-established concept of liberty in a free society is that citizens should be free to do as they please, and the state should only intervene to the extent necessary to prevent this freedom being exercised in a way that inhibits the freedom of others. A similar point can be made with respect to the use of identity. The key point is that you can be mischievous with your identity to whatever extent you like provided it does not breach a government imposed regulation or cause harm to someone within the bounds of tort law. Alternatively, there may be a tortious action with respect to protection of trading or business interests. Three of the most relevant torts in this context would be injurious falsehood, passing off and deceit. All three aim to prevent one person gaining at the expense of another. An injurious falsehood may be perpetrated if a business has a certain quality that the defendant denies. A passing off occurs if you appropriate the way another person presents his or her goods or services to the public. The tort of deceit is made out if you profit from the deception of another. In practice these torts are rarely invoked these days as they have been subsumed by the abundance of legislation placing a restraint on the use of misleading or deceptive words or conduct to induce someone to enter a contract. (Balkin and Davis 1996)
Although these torts may have been subsumed by legislation in many jurisdictions, the torts will often still exist. As ever the difficulty will be to find a causal link between the use of a different name and the damage suffered.
Some countries have laws, like the UK Misrepresentation Act 1967, which deal with misleading statements that cause a party to be induced to sign a contract. The UK legislation extends protection to include innocent misrepresentations. This may apply to people using different names to protect their privacy, but it would be very difficult to establish a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the loss.
Perhaps more than any other area, simple contractual situations are the least likely to require identification and authentication. In isolated transactions this is certainly the case, even though there may be a functional desire to identify the parties for the purpose of after sale service or a need to ensure that the respective on-going obligations of the parties are met. Regardless of this functional aspect, in most cases parties are free to enter into contracts without identifying themselves or submitting to any test of authenticity. Even in some jurisdictions where certain types of contracts must be in written form, there still does not appear to be any strong reason compelling the identification or authentication of the parties. The central issue in electronic commerce is functionality, which is a matter of convenience rather than compulsion.
Anonymity is certainly a controversial issue (Lewis 1994, Kanaley 1995, Godwin 1995, Froomkin 1996), with both supporters (Akst 1995) and critics (Mossberg 1995). In many situations anonymous transactions are perfectly permissible, as long as they do not hurt anyone in a way that falls within the sphere of criminal fraud or negligent misrepresentation, or are specifically prohibited by legislation. For example, virtually all cash transactions are anonymous, either by accident or by design. Anonymity remains one of the most effective responses to threats to personal privacy.
There are certainly many situations where it is not desirable to leave indications of personal association, such as traceable information indicating your whereabouts and spending patterns, as might be possible through analysing a credit card transaction statement.
Nevertheless, commentators such as Strassman and Marlow (1996) are clearly concerned about widespread use of anonymity. From their perspective the mere fact that it is possible to act anonymously on the Internet (for example by using anonymous re-mailers) amounts to a serious threat to the future of the so-called Global Information Infrastructure.
As ever there are conflicting legal rules and principles at work here. We have already identified some of the potential scenarios where acting anonymously may be prohibited, and yet in the United States the Supreme Court case of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (63 U.S.L.W. 4279 (1995)) held that Mrs McIntyre had a right to make political statements anonymously at election time in contravention of state law because that was "core" to the First Amendment right to free speech. This follows a long line of US cases where various laws and ordinances preventing anonymous communications have been overturned. In one of the earlier Supreme Court cases, Talley v California (362 U.S. 60), the defendant had been distributing handbills in support of equal employment opportunities for "Negroes, Mexicans and Orientals", without identifying the individual directors of the organisation named in the handbill. Once again the right to do so was upheld under the First Amendment right to free speech.
In Australia where the freedom of political discussion is implied rather than expressly guaranteed in the constitution, there has been similar distinction between political or election time speech and `ordinary' commercial speech. Even in the United States, the right to commercial, rather than political speech would be subject to a lower level of First Amendment protection. (see First Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
It is curious that in an environment where there are increasing opportunities to act anonymously through the use of technologies such as anonymous re-mailers, some anonymous technologies like David Chaum's Digicash have not been embraced in the most enthusiastic manner. Digicash has many properties of real cash because it uses strict encryption methods to protect the privacy of the consumer. Was Digicash a bad business model? or has the public already been duped into believing that outside the recreational role-playing environments of MUDs and BSSs, identification and authentication are not the exception but the rule.
An interesting twist to the anonymous/pseudonymous debate comes from Canada where the 1994 amendments to the Canadian Copyright Act guaranteed the right of an author to write using a pseudonym. Section 14.1 deals specifically with moral rights and underscores the author's right to to write "under a pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous". Although moral rights have traditionally only been a part of civil law systems, the increasing internationalisation of copyright laws under the Berne Convention and more recently the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) means that they will be increasingly integrated into the copyright regimes of all member nations.
It has become commonplace to acknowledge that "The Internet presents new challenges to law enforcement." Clarke et al. (1998a) As international legal regimes act concertedly to regulate the use, transmission and manipulation of personal data identification, authentication and privacy all come to the fore as issues of considerable importance. However these issues are surprisingly little discussed, either in information systems or legal literature.
Identification is usually used for functional reasons, as a matter of choice and convenience. Rarely is it under compulsion. Compulsion can be formal, through state regulation, or informal, through trade-off when you want something that either a private or public monopoly can give you that no one else can. Perhaps at a deeper level the problem is with the state allowing monopolies to develop because then those entities can start to amass more and more information. Identifiers vary in terms of uniqueness and changeability; biological ones are the most accurate but they often represent serious infringements to personal privacy considerations. Once the state starts wanting too much information we can make political complaints; and in a good political system there are enough checks and balances to pose an obstacle for this. Unfortunately there are many countries where authoritarian regimes do not allow citizens to complain in this way, and it is those governments that are most likely to be perpetrating the worst abuses on personal privacy.
Authentication itself is not so much a problem, but the ongoing drive to find ever more accurate ways to tie a set of data to a specific person is problematic. The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness of situations where authentication is and is not legally required, and to introduce alternative considerations. For example if you work in a government, you may want to keep a watch on monopolies and the way technology can expand the scope for fraud. If you are acting as an individual, be aware that you often do not need to divulge identity. If you represent a business and you want consumer information, increase the uniqueness of your product so you can ask for it and people may be inclined to provide such information.
It is impertinent of governments and companies to swiftly overturn the balance between exploitation and protection of personal data that has arisen from over the centuries. It is essential that we encourage public scrutiny and debate about the implications of the actions that will filter down from organisations seeking more identification and authentication. It should be the responsibility of those organisations to prepare and prove their case for any further encroachment onto personal privacy.
Akst, D. (1995) `Postcard from Cyberspace: The Helsinki Incident and the right to Anonymity' Los Angeles Times, Wednesday February 22, 1995, at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/~avi/NII/PENET_broke.html
Balkin, R. and Davis, J.L.R. (1996) Law of Torts Butterworths, Sydney.
Clarke R. (1994) 'Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues', Information Technology & People 7,4 (December 1994) 6-37, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/HumanID.html
Clarke R. (1996a) 'Trails in the Sand', May 1996, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Trails.html
Clarke R. (1996b) 'Identification, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Consumer Transactions: A Vital Systems Design and Public Policy Issue' Proc. Conf. 'Smart Cards: The Issues', Sydney, 18 October 1996, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/AnonPsPol.html
Clarke R. (1997a) 'Cookies' February 1997, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/Cookies.html
Clarke R. (1997b) 'Chip-Based ID: Promise and Peril', for the International Conference on Privacy, Montreal (September 1997), at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/IDCards97.html
Clarke R. (1998) 'Information Privacy On the Internet: Cyberspace Invades Personal Space' Telecommunication Journal of Australia 48, 2 (May/June1998), at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/IPrivacy.html
Clarke R. (1999) 'Internet Privacy Concerns Confirm the Case for Intervention', Communications of the ACM 42, 2 (February 1999), at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/CACM99.html
Clarke R., Dempsey G., Ooi C.N. & O'Connor R.F. (1998a) `Technological Aspects of Internet Crime Prevention', Proc. Conf. 'Internet Crime', Australian Institute for Criminology, Melbourne University, 16-17 February 1998, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/ICrimPrev.html
Clarke R., Dempsey G., Ooi C.N. & O'Connor R.F. (1998b) `The Technical Feasibility of Regulating Gambling on the Internet', Proc. Conf. 'Gambling, Technology & Society: Regulatory Challenges for the 21st Century', Rex Hotel Sydney, Potts Point, 7 - 8 May 1998, Australian Institute for Criminology, Melbourne University, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/ICrimPrev.html
Froomkin, A. M. (1996) `Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living With Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases' 15 U. Pittsburgh Journal of Law and Commerce 395, at http://www.law.miami.edu~froomkin/articles/ocean1.html
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Godwin, M. (1995) `Who Was that Masked Man?' Law of the Net January 1995, Volume 6, number 1, at http://www.internetworld.com/print/monthly/1995/01/law.html
Goldberg, I., Wagner, D., Brewer, E. (1997) `Privacy-enhancing technologies for the Internet', Procedings of COMPCON '97, San Hose, February, 1997 at http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/privacy-compcon97-www/privacy-html.html
Greenleaf G.W. & Clarke R. (1998) 'Privacy Implications of Digital Signatures', Proc. IBC Conference on Digital Signatures, Sydney, March 1997, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/DigSig.html
Kanaley, R. (1995) `Internet's anonymity a boon to the `twisted'', Philadelphia Inquirer, Wednesday February 1, 1995, at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/~avi/NII/ANON_twisted.html
Lewis, P. (1994) `Computer Jokes and Threats Ignite Debate on Anonymity', The New York Times, December 31, 1994, pages 1,55, at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/~avi/NII/NYT_non-amok.html
Mossberg, W. (1995) `Personal Technology', The Wall Street Journal, Thursday January 26, 1995, page B1, at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/~avi/NII/wsj_no-anon.html
Post, D. (1996) `The First Internet War', Reason Magazine, April 1996, at http://www.cli.org/Dpost/X0003_ARTICLE4.html
Rose, L. (1995) `Anonymity Online: Its Value and Its Social Costs', Legally Online, June 1995, at http://boardwatch.internet.com/mag/95/jun/bwm45.html
Strassman, P. and Marlow, W. (1996) `Risk-Free Access Into The Global Information Infrastructure Via Anonymous Re-Mailers', Symposium on the Global Information Infrastructure: Information, Policy & International Infrastructure, Cambridge, MA, January 28-39, 1996, at http://www.strassman.com/pubs/anon-remail.htm
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