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National Identity Cards? Bust the Myth of 'Security über Alles'!

Roger Clarke **

Panel Notes of 8 February 2006

For an invited presentation to a Session on 'National Identity Cards: The Privacy-Security Balance', at the 7th Annual Privacy & Security Conference of the Government of British Columbia, 9-10 February 2006, Victoria BC

© Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, 2006

This document is at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/NatID-BC-0602.html

The slide-set is at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/NatID-BC-0602.ppt

Abstract

National identity cards are an extremist measure, attuned to the needs of countries subject to central planning and despots, not to the expectations of free countries.

The dangers of the card are serious enough, but the real focus needs to be on the dangers of the 'national identification scheme' that provides the infrastructure to go with it.

Proponents of national identity cards are confronted by the obligations to demonstrate that:

• vast benefits will accrue as a result of a national identity card;
• those benefits could not be achieved without it;
• the huge negative impacts on privacy and freedom can be ameliorated;
• the protections will not be able to be circumvented by future governments, legitimate or otherwise, intent on imposing total control on the population.

These obligations are extraordinarily onerous.

No proponents of any national scheme have ever been able to produce evidence that major benefits will accrue.

On the contrary, when proposals have been subjected to analysis, it has been found that:

• assertions of benefits are illusory, and often downright fraudulent;
• features to ameliorate the impacts on privacy are grossly inadequate. This may be intentional, but it would be in any case extremely difficult to design protections that are effective against an intrinsically intrusive scheme;
• such schemes are not proof against despots. Expressed more precisely: the powers over the populace that derive from such a scheme are enormous; and no means have ever been demonstrated whereby abuse of those powers could be prevented, whether by an unelected government (e.g. as a result of invasion or a military putsch), or an elected government (e.g. that acts outside the law, or achieves the enactment of 'exceptional' powers).

Invocation of the 'national security' sacred cow must never be accepted at face value, but questioned at every turn.

The title of the session is seriously mis-judged: there can be no reconciliation between privacy and security that involves a national identity card.

Appendix: Elements of a 'National Identification Scheme'

Proponents of national identification schemes like to present them as being something simple and unthreatening. Most commonly, they focus on it being all about 'just another card'. And they promote real and mythical advantages of the card, e.g. it will reduce 'wallet-bulge', and it will provide a single authoritative identification token that every government agency and company will accept.

But such a scheme involves many elements. Moreover, the benefits claimed cannot be achieved unless very tight control over society is achieved. Hence:

• any proposal that comprises less than the complete set is fraudulent; and
• any scheme that starts with just some of them will inevitably be either enhanced until it is complete, or its outcomes will fall enormously short of what was promised from it.

Further information is provided on the many elements that make up a national identification scheme:

1. A Database
2. A Unique Signifier for Every Individual
   • A 'Unique Identifier'
   • A Biometric Entifier
3. An (Id)entification Token (such as an ID Card)

• Quality Assurance Mechanisms
  • Mechanisms for (Id)entity Authentication
  • Mechanisms for (Id)entification
• Widespread Use
  • Widespread Data Flows Containing the Identifier
  • Widepread Use of the (Id)entifier
  • Widespread Use of the Database
• Obligations
  • Obligations Imposed on Every Individual
  • Obligations Imposed on Many Organisations
• Sanctions for Non-Compliance

A set of Resources on national identification schemes is also available.

Presenter Background, and Generic Resources

Roger Clarke is a consultant with expertise in strategic and policy aspects of eBusiness, information infrastructure, and dataveillance and privacy.

He has spent 35 years in the I.T. industry, in Sydney, London, Zürich and Canberra, as professional, manager, academic, consultant and company Director and Chair. He holds degrees, including a doctorate, in Information Systems (MIS). He spent 1984-95 as a senior academic. He has held visiting professorships at universities in Switzerland and Austria, and has current visiting professorships in Australia and Hong Kong. Biodata here.

This presentation draws on over 20 years' research, consultancy and advocacy experience in relation to these topics. Papers relevant to this topic are indexed here.

• human identification in information systems
• (id)entity, (id)entification and (id)entifiers
• authentication, including (id)entity authentication
• Privacy-Invasive Technologies (the PITs), a term which I originated
• Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs)
• identification-related technologies such as smartcards, digital signatures/PKI and biometrics
• identity management architectures, techniques and tools
• national identification scheme initiatives generally, including here and here
• particular instances of national identification scheme initiatives:
  • the Australia Card initiative - 1985-87
  • the ultra-extensible Australian Tax File Number scheme - 1988-1992
  • the new Hong Kong SAR ID Card - 1999-
  • the UK ID Card initiative - 2004-
  • the Australia Card Mark II initiative - 2005-

My lengthy list of publications in these areas is indexed here.

Author Affiliations

Roger Clarke is Principal of Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, Canberra. He is also a Visiting Professor in the Cyberspace Law & Policy Centre at the University of N.S.W., a Visiting Professor in the E-Commerce Programme at the University of Hong Kong, and a Visiting Professor in the Department of Computer Science at the Australian National University.

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Created: 18 January 2006 - Last Amended: 8 February 2006 by Roger Clarke - Site Last Verified: 15 February 2009
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